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Abstract
This paper analyzes the both online-channel price discount 
and advertising decisions in a dual-channel supply chain 
involved one manufacturer and one retailer. A Stackelberg 
game dominated by the manufacturer is established. The 
influence of asymmetric demand information is analyzed. 
The study shows that retailer has a motivation to lie about 
the offline demand information and it always announces 
a higher advertising impact factor. To induce the retailer 
to reveal to true demand information, a franchise-fee 
contract is designed.
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INTRODUCTION
With the development of E-commerce, great changes 
have happened in marketing methods and manufactures’ 
distribution channels. Nowadays, large numbers of 
manufactures have opened their own websites to sell 
products online, while through the offline retailing channel. 
Many manufactures have operated their market through this 
kind of online and offline dual channel, such as Samsung, 
IBM, Lenovo and Apple. Usually, online websites can 
only provide brief products information for consumers, 
but offline retailing channels can help consumers acquire 
full information about products. In order to improve online 
market share and obtain more revenue, manufactures often 
provide price discount on their own websites. This kind 
of discount promotion strategy helps the manufactures 
increase online consumers, but also hurts the offline 
consumer amount. As a result, retailers will get dissatisfied 
with this strategy. In this condition, manufactures can use 
cooperative advertising method, which is widely used in 
practical operation, to relieve the channel conflict. So, it is 
necessary for manufactures to keep a balance between the 
use of online discount strategy and cooperative advertising 
method. Furthermore, retailers actually have a better 
knowledge about demand information than manufactures, 
because retailers always have direct contact with 
consumers. Asymmetric demand information may exist 
between manufactures and retailers. Therefore, it is highly 
possible for retailers to lie about the demand information, 
and it is important to help manufactures prohibit retailers’ 
lying behavior.
As a coordination method between manufacture and 
retailers, cooperative advertising has attracted lots of 
attention from world-wide researchers. Our paper focuses 
on the cooperative advertising problem in dual channel. 
Zhang et al. (2014) examine the effects of supply chains 
members’ cooperative advertising and costs sharing 
behavior on dual channel coordination on condition that 
manufacturer opens online and retail channel at the same 
time. Results show that no matter what effect retailer’s 
promotion has on brand image, when manufacturer pays 
part of retailer’s advertising cost, the outcome of two 
members would be better than that in the decentralized 
channel, but worse than that in the centralized situation. 
Opening a new online channel besides the offline channel, 
Berger et al. (2006) examine integration decisions from 
a cooperative advertising perspective to determine the 
profitability of various integration strategies. Yan et al. 
(2006) obtain equilibrium pricing and co-op advertising 
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policies under two different competitive scenarios: 
Bertrand and Stackelberg equilibrium. They also compare 
the profit gains under these two marketing games. Wang 
and Zhou (2009) analyze the pricing and advertising 
decision under different pricing schemes. The impact 
of cooperative advertising on the optimal decisions is 
investigated. Huang et al. (2011) study the influence 
of cooperative advertising strategy on channel supply 
chain pricing decision, the two-echelon supply chain 
system composed of one manufacture and one retailer 
was considered. Li et al. (2015) consider a dyadic supply 
chain consisting of a manufacturer and a traditional 
retailer. In addition, the effect of a fairness concern of the 
manufacturer is investigated. Chen et al. (2016) focus on 
the cooperative advertising in a dual-channel supply chain 
where price competition and advertising competition exist 
simultaneously between manufacturer’s online channel 
and retailer’s traditional channel.
Besides considering both price discount  and 
cooperating in a dual channel, our paper also investigates 
the demand information asymmetry between manufacture 
and retailer. Özalp et al. (2006) study how to assure 
credible forecast information sharing between a 
supplier and a manufacturer. When the buyer has better 
knowledge about demand than supplier, Burnetas et al. 
(2007) investigates how a supplier can use a quantity 
discount schedule to influence the stocking decisions of a 
downstream buyer that faces a single period of stochastic 
demand. Gan et al. (2010) study a drop-shipping supply 
chain in which the retailer receives a customer’s order 
and the supplier fills it. In such a chain, the supplier keeps 
inventory and bears inventory risks; the retailer focuses 
on marketing and customer acquisition, and forwards the 
orders to the supplier. Babich et al. (2012) solve a buyback 
contract design problem for a supplier who is working 
with a retailer who possesses private information about 
the demand distribution. When demand is uncertain and 
unobservable to the supplier, Heese et al. (2014) consider 
a supply chain with a supplier that sells to a retailer under 
a revenue-sharing arrangement. Yang et al. (2015) analyze 
the advertising decisions in a dual-channel supply chain 
involved one manufacturer and one retailer. The influence 
of asymmetric demand information and dual-channel on 
the cooperative advertising decisions is also analyzed.
Reviewing the above literature, we find that the most 
relevant paper to our paper is Yang et al. (2015). However, 
the do not consider the impact of online price discount 
on both retailer and manufacture’s decisions. Meanwhile, 
they do not conduct further analysis on the effect of 
demand information.
1.  BASIC MODEL
1.1  Model Description and Assumption
A supply chain comprised of a manufacture and a retailer 
is investigated in the basic Stackelberg game model. In 
this basic model, manufacture is the leader and retailer is 
the follower. The manufacture opens its online channel 
while sells products through an offline retailer. Assuming 
the retailer’s sales represented by pr, manufacture sets the 
wholesale price as w . Through providing a price discount 
on the online channel, manufacture’s online price is pe, w 
<pe ≤ pr. In this way, the price discount provided online 
is σ=1–pe / pr. Then, we see that the price discount σ 
must be confined to a closed interval, say 0≤σ<1–w/pr. 
Given pr fixed, we can infer that higher price discount σ 
can lead to a lower online price. Meanwhile, define the 
value of parameter b(b≥0) as the retailer’s advertising 
effort on products. Like many former researches, the 
total advertising cost will be represented in a quadratic 
form C(b)=b2/2. Manufacture shares a part of the total 
advertising cost with retailer, and the part ratio is 1–t. So, 
the manufacture will afford the expense (1–t)b2/2 and the 
retailer’s shared cost will be tb2/2.
Chen et al. (2016) set the demand model in the 
form of price discount effect multiplied the advertising 
effect. However, their model may be unreasonable when 
advertising effort is zero. Unlike Cheng et al.’s (2016) 
research and simplify the problem, our paper assumes 
the demand function in the form of linear model. We 
can get demand functions of the both online and offline 
channels:
  De=s·a+θe·σ+γe·b, (1)
  Dr=(1–s)·a–θr·σ+γr·b. (2)
From Formulas (1) and (2), total market size is a. 
When manufacture does not provide price discount and 
retailer does not invest in advertisement, online initial 
market share is s·a and the offline market share is (1–
s)·a. Providing the price discount, more consumers may 
be attracted by the products. So, the total market size will 
increase. Because some of the offline consumers are price-
sensitive, part of the consumers will transfer from offline 
to online. When σ increases, it is reasonable to believe 
that online demand De increases and offline demand Dr 
decreases. θe and θr are σ’s impact factor on online and 
offline demand, θe>θr>0. Different from σ, advertising 
effort b has a positive impact on both offline and online 
demand, γe>0 and γr>0. As this paper focuses on the 
influence of price discount and cooperative advertising, the 
model is simplified in three aspects. The first is that we do 
not consider price’s effect on demand. The sales price pr 
and wholesale price w are given exogenously. The second 
is that we only consider the retailer’s advertising behavior, 
but do not consider manufacture’s own advertising effort. 
It is reasonable not to consider manufacture’s advertising 
effort. Because the price discount promotion strategy has 
the same effect like advertisement to some extent. It is not 
necessary for manufacture to operate price discount and 
advertising simultaneously. Without loss of generality, the 
third assumption is that manufacturing cost of the product 
is zero. Revenue functions of the both manufacture and 
retailer are:
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     πm= pr·(1–σ)·(s·a+θe·σ+γe·b) +w
           ·[(1–s)·a–θr·σ+γr·b]–(1–t)·b
2/2 ,    (3)
     πr=( pr –w)·[(1–s)·a–θr·σ+γr·b]–tb
2/2 .    (4)
According to the preceding article, the manufacture 
acts as the leader, who first announces its price discount 
σ and advertisement sharing ratio 1–t to maximize 
its revenue. In response to σ and 1–t, the traditional 
retailer (the follower) updates its advertising effort b to 
maximize its revenue. Through the standard backward 
induction, we can easily derive the optimal decision of 
both retailer and manufacture in 2.2 under asymmetric 
information.  
1.2  Decision Analysis 
Given manufacture’s decision of σ and 1–t, the retailer’s 
advertising effort reaction is:
  b=(pr–w)· γr/t (5)
and the retailer’s optimal revenue as a function of σ and b 
is:
πr=(pr–w)·[(1–s)·a–θr·σ+γr·b]–b·( pr –w)· γr /2 . (6)
From Formula (5), we can infer that b has a linear 
correlation with t. To solve the decision of t, we can 
instead solve the decision of b. Substituting Formula (5) 
into Formula (4) and simplifying, we get
πm= pr·(1–σ)·(s·a+θe·σ+γe·b) –w·[(1–s)·a–θr·σ+γr·b] 
      –b2/2–b·( pr –w)· γr /2 .    (7)
It is easily to know that πm is respectively concave 
in σ and b. We use the two-stage optimization method 
to maximize the manufacture’s revenue πm, i.e., we 
first derive the optimal price discount σ for any given 
advertising effort b, then we determine the optimal 
advertising effort b to maximize πm. The optimal price 
discount and advertising effort are:
      σ*=[ w·θr–(pr+w)· γr·γe·pr·/2+ pr
2·γe
2–pr·(θe–s·a)]
            /( pr
2·γe
2–2·pr·θe) ,                    (8)
    b*=[–(pr+w)· γr·θe·pr–pr·γe·w·θr –pr
2·γe·(θe+s·a)]
          /( pr
2·γe
2–2·pr·θe) .     (9)
To examine Formula (9), *b  is determined not to be 
negative. So, we can have 
  b*=[–(pr+w)· γr·θe·pr–pr·γe·w·θr –pr
2·γe·(θe+s·a)]
 
       /( pr
2·γe
2–2·pr·θe)≥0.   (10)
According Formula (10), we can know that 
  pr
2·γe
2–2·pr·θe<0 . (11)
While analyzing formula (7), the hessian matrix of 
πm(σ,b) is 
 2
1
r e r e
r e
p p
H
p
θ θ
θ
− ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ 
=  − ⋅ − 
.
Combine Formula (11), we can derive that |H|=2·pr·θe–
pr
2·γe
2>0. That is to say, πm(σ,b) is jointly concave in σ and 
b. Then we can get the theorem 1
Theorem 1
Under the symmetric demand information scenario, 
the optimal equilibrium advertising effort, price discount 
and cost sharing ratio for the retailer and manufacture are 
given by
b*=[–(pr+w)· γr·θe·pr–pr·γe·w·θr –pr
2·γe·(θe+s·a)]
 
                /( pr
2·γe
2–2·pr·θe) ,
     σ*=[w·θr–(pr+w)· γr·γe·pr·/2+ pr
2·γe
2–pr
                   ·(θe–s·a)]
 /( pr
2·γe
2–2·pr·θe) ,
     t*=(pr-w)· γr
 / b*.
To examine the impact of s, γe and γr on the online 
retailer’s optimal advertising decision, we take the first-
order derivatives of b* with respect to s, γe and γr. Then it 
is also interesting to examine the impact of s, θe and θr on 
the online manufacture’s optimal decisions, we also take 
the first-order derivatives of σ* and t* with respect to s, θe 
and θr.
We can obtain proposition 1.
Proposition 1
(i) ∂b*/∂s>0; ∂b*/∂γe>0; ∂b
*/∂γr>0 
(ii) ∂σ*/∂s<0; ∂σ*/∂θe <0; ∂σ
*/∂θr <0 
(iii) ∂t*/∂s<0; ∂t*/∂γe<0; ∂t
*/∂θr <0
From proposition 1(i), we can get that: retailer should 
always increase the advertisement expense when the 
retailer’s initial market share (1–s) is getting smaller. 
Meanwhile, once the advertising is easier to convert to 
demand in any distribution channel, it is more profitable 
for retailer to invest in more advertisement fee. From 
(ii) and (iii), we can propose that: manufacture should 
decrease their price discount σ* and increase cost sharing 
ratio 1–t* when the online initial market share is getting 
larger. In contrast, it should decrease σ* when it becomes 
easier to attract online consumers through providing 
price discount. 1–t* should be increased when it becomes 
easier to attract online consumers through advertising. In 
the end, if it is easier to attract consumers from offline to 
online by providing price discount, manufacture should 
decrease σ* and increase 1–t*. For the manufacture, all 
changes of 1–t* are contrary to the changes of σ*, because 
price discount is a competitive tool to get consumer from 
retailer, while the cost sharing ratio is an effective tool to 
coordinate conflict caused by competition.
2.  DECISION ANALYSIS AND CONTRACT 
DESIGN UNDER ASYMMETRIC DEMAND 
INFORMATION
Because retailer always has direct contact with offline 
consumers while manufacture does not. There is a high 
probability for retailer not to announce the demand 
information for its own revenue. This section, a dual-
channel Stackelberg model will be considered. In this 
model, we assume the demand information is retailer’s 
private information which is unknown to manufacture. 
According to (Lei et al., 2015), retailer has already known 
its demand information θr and γr before making decisions. 
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But manufacture does not know effects on offline 
demand caused by price discount and advertising effort. 
Apart from this, we assume that s, a, θr, γe are common 
knowledge between manufacture and retailer.
2.1  Retailer’s Lying Behavior
Due to the asymmetric demand information, retailer 
is possible to lie about the impact factors θr and γr. In 
3.1, we will investigate whether the retailer has the 
motivation to lie about the demand information. Assume 
the impact factors retailer announces to retailer is θr’ and 
γr
’, according to Formulas (6), (8), and (9), the retailer’s 
revenue, price discount and advertising effort will be:
πr(θr’,γr’)=( pr –w)·[(1–s)·a–θr·σ(θr’,γr’)+γr·b(θr’,γr’)]
                –b(θr’,γr’)·( pr –w)·γr’ /2 ,
   σ(θr’,γr’)=[ w·θr’+(pr+w)· γr’·γe·pr·/2+ pr
2·γe
2–pr·(θe–s·a)]
 
                         /( pr
2·γe
2–2·pr·θe) ,
    b(θr’,γr’)=[–(pr+w)· γr’·θe·pr–pr·γe·w·θr’ –pr
2·γe·(θe+s·a)]
                /( pr
2·γe
2–2·pr·θe) .
Given θr’, taking the second-derivative of πr(θr’,γr’) 
with respect to γr’, we get:
∂2πr(θr’,γr’)/∂ γr’
2=(pr–w)· (pr+w)· pr·θe
 /( pr
2·γe
2–2·pr·θe) 
                              <0 .
So, given θr’, the optimal decision of γr’
 is:
γr
’*=γr+γe·[ pr·(θe–θr+s·a)+ w·(θr’ –θr)] 
                       /[2·(pr+w)·θe] , (12)
given the γr’, take a first-derivative of πr(θr’,γr’) with 
respect to θr’. We can get:
∂πr(θr’,γr’)/∂ θr’=w·(γr’·γe·pr·/2–γr·γe·pr–θr)
                          /( pr
2·γe
2–2·pr·θe) .  (13)
Combine Formulas (12) and (13), we derive theorem 2:
Theorem 2
(i) if γr’(θr’=0)·γe·pr·/2–γr·γe·pr–θr<0 
θr
’*=0, γr’*=γr+γe·[ pr·(θe–θr+s·a)–w·θr)] /[2·(pr+w)·θe].
(ii) if γr’(θr’=θe)·γe·pr·/2–γr·γe·pr–θr>0
θr
’*=θe, γr
’*=γr+γe·[ pr·(θe–θr+s·a)+ w·(θe –θr)]
                           /[2·(pr+w)·θe].
(iii) if γr’(θr’=0)·γe·pr·/2–γr·γe·pr–θr<0<γr’(θr’=θe) 
·γe·pr·/2–γr·γe·pr–θr
θr
’*=[2·(pr+w)·θe·(γr·γe·pr+2·θr) –γe·pr
                                    ·(θe–θr+s·a)+ w·θr]/(γe· w), γr’*
                                 =2·(γr·γe·pr+θr)/( pr·γe) .
From theorem 2, we can know that the retailer may 
announce different impact factors of price discount and 
advertising effort based on different conditions. So, we 
can obtain proposition 2.
Proposition 2
Retailer has a motivation to lie about the impact factors 
of price discount and advertising effort. 
( i)  When retailer l ies a low θ r’(θ r’=0) ,  if  the 
corresponding γr’(θr’=0) is high enough, the optimal 
decision of θr’ should acquire a very low value (θr’=0). 
The optimal decision of γr’ has following characters: 
∂γr
’*/∂s>0; ∂γr’*/∂a>0; 
∂γr
’*/∂γe>0; ∂γr’*/∂w<0; 
                          ∂γr
’*/∂θr<0.
(ii) When retailer lies a high θr’(θr’=θe), if the 
corresponding γr’(θr’=θe) is low enough, the optimal 
decision of θr
’ should acquire a very high value (θr’=θe). 
The optimal decision of γr’ has the same characters in (i).
(iii) Except the above condition, retailer may lie a 
moderate θr’(0<θr’*<θe). The optimal decision of γr’ has 
following characters: 
∂γr
’*/∂θr>0, ∂γr’*/∂pr >0, ∂γr’*/∂γe<0.
Also, we should point out that retailer will always lie a 
higher impact factor of advertising effort than the real one 
(γr’ >γr). Furthermore, it is easy to prove that retailer’s 
lying behavior may cause revenue loss of manufacture 
(πm(θr,γr)*>πm(θr’*,γr’*)).
According to proposition 2(i), the retailer’s lying 
behavior contains three different conditions. When 
retailer’s optimal announcement of price discount impact 
factor θr’* is rather low θr’*=0 or high θr’*=θe, the optimal 
announcement of advertising effort impact factor γr’* 
has the same characters. When the total market size a, 
manufacture’s initial online market share s and offline 
advertising effort γe increase, retailer may lie higher 
γr
’*. However, when wholesale price w and offline price 
discount impact factor θr increase, the retailer may lie 
lower γr’*. On other conditions, retailer may lie a moderate 
θr
’*. The advertising effort impact factor decision γr’* will 
have an opposite character from (i), (ii).
2.2  Contract Description 
In proposition 2, we have proposed that retailer will lie 
about the demand information to obtain higher revenue. 
This lying behavior will hurt manufacture’s revenue. So, 
it is necessary for manufacture to take some action to deal 
with this condition. From the perspective of manufacture, 
effective strategies like contract designing should be 
conducted to prohibit retailer from lying. In this part, an 
optimal contract menu is obtained to induce retailer to real 
demand information.
The contract menu should consider both individual 
rational (IR) constraint and incentive compatibility (IC) 
constraint. The individual rational constraint means that 
retailer may acquire a higher revenue if it accepts the 
revenue-sharing than not. The incentive compatibility 
constraint means that retailer will be induced to share the 
true demand information. Though the manufacture does 
not know retailer’s demand information θr and γr, it resorts 
to a prior belief and considers them continuous random 
variables with values in  [ , ]r rθ θ  and  [ , ]r rγ γ  with c.d.f. 
Fθr(·), Fγr(·) and p.d.f. fθr(·), fγr(·). θr and γr are independent 
from each other. The timing of our model is as follows: 
(i) The retailer knows the demand information while 
manufacture knows the demand distribution; (ii) The 
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manufacture designs the solutions set as {σ(θr,γr), t(θr,γr), 
L(θr,γr)}, σ(θr,γr) is price discount, t(θr,γr) is advertisement 
sharing ratio, L(θr,γr) is the franchise fee from the retailer 
to the manufacturer; (iii) The retailer is induce to tell true 
demand information and to make advertising effort b. The 
θr and γr retailer announces are θr’ and γr’.
The manufacture’s revenue function:
πm(σ(θr’,γr’),t(θr’,γr’),L(θr’,γr’))=pr·(1–σ(θr’,γr’)) ·( s·a+θe·σ(θr’,γr’)+γe·b(θr,γr))+w·[(1–s)·a–θr·σ(θr’,γr’)
                                                              +γr·b(θr,γr)] –(1–t(θr’,γr’))·b(θr,γr)
2/2+ L(θr’,γr’).               (14)
The retailer’s revenue function:
        πr(σ(θr’,γr’),t(θr’,γr’),L(θr’,γr’),θr,γr)=(pr–w)·[(1–s)·a–θr·σ(θr’,γr’)+γr·b(θr,γr)]–t(θr’,γr’)·b(θr,γr)
2/2+ L(θr’,γr’)        (15)
According to incentive compatibility (IC) constraint, retailer will be induced to share the true demand information:
                                      πr(σ(θr,γr),t(θr,γr),L(θr,γr), θr,γr)≥πr(σ(θr’,γr’),t(θr’,γr’),L(θr’,γr’), θr,γr) .                                          (16)
According to individual rational (IR) constraint, retailer may acquire a higher revenue if it accepts the franchise-fee 
contract than not:
                                                    πr(σ(θr,γr),t(θr,γr),L(θr,γr), θr,γr)≥πmin
r .                                                                      (17)
Take retailer’s optimal decision of b  into retailer’s revenue function, we can get:
πr(σ(θr’,γr’),t(θr’,γr’),L(θr’,γr’), θr,γr)= (pr–w)·[(1–s)·a–θr·σ(θr’,γr’)+ (pr–w)· γr
2/(2·t(θr’,γr’))] –L(θr’,γr’)
given γr, there should be 
∂πr(θr,γr)/∂θr=∂πr(σ(θr’,γr’),t(θr’,γr’),L(θr’,γr’), θr,γr)/∂θr|θr’=θr,γr’=γr=–(pr–w)· σ(θr,γr);
given θr, there should be 
∂πr(θr,γr)/∂γr=∂πr(σ(θr
’,γr
’),t(θr
’,γr
’),L(θr
’,γr
’), θr,γr)/∂γr|θr’=θr,γr’=γr=(pr–w)
2· γr/t(θr,γr).
The retailer’s problem can be converted into:
    ' ' ' ' ' '
, ,
max ( ( , ), ( , ), ( , )) ( ) ( )
r r
r r
r r
m r r r r r r r r r rt L
t L f f d d
γ θ
θ γγ θσ
π σ θ γ θ γ θ γ θ γ θ γ⋅ ⋅∫ ∫ , (18)
                        s.t.  (pr–w)·[(1–s)·a–θr·σ(θr,γr)+(pr–w)· γr
2/(2·t(θr,γr))]–L(θr,γr) 
                                                       ≥ (pr–w)·[(1–s)·a–θr·σ(θr’,γr’)+ (pr–w)· γr
2/(2·t(θr’,γr’))]–L(θr’,γr’) ,                   (19)
                                                 (pr–w)·[(1–s)·a–θr·σ(θr,γr)+(pr–w)· γr
2/(2·t(θr,γr))]–L(θr,γr) ≥πmin
r .                            (20)
Lemma 1
According to the two IC and IR constraints, it can be 
easily derived that: σ(θr,γr) is only decreasing in θr; t(θr,γr) 
is only decreasing in γr.
From Lemma1, we can know that when both the 
information of θr and γr are asymmetric. It is hard to derive 
the optimal contract to maximize manufacture’s revenue, 
while inducing retailer to tell the true information.
2.3  Contract Design 
In this part, we consider a special case of the initial 
problem. We assume that impact of price discount is 
known to both manufacture and retailer. That is to say, 
only the γr is private information of retailer’s information. 
Furthermore, we design the optimal franchise-fee contract 
menu {σ(θr,γr),t(θr,γr),L(θr,γr)}to solve the problem in 
(18)-(20). We can get:
                         (i)   
 2
min
( )
( )
( , )
r
r
rr
r r
r r
p w y
dy
t
γ
γ
π γ π
θ γ
− ⋅
= +∫                                                                                       (21)
  (ii) (22)
Manufacture’s expected revenue will be:
 
2
2 2
( )
(1 ( )) ( ( ) )
( )
( )
[(1 ) ( ) ]
( )
( )
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(1 ( )) [ ] ( ) [(1 ) ( )
2 ( )
( ) ( )
]
2 ( ) ( )
r
r
r r
r r e r e
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Theorem 2
   σf(γr)=1–[a·s·γr+θe·γr+θr·γr+(pr·γr
2+pr·γr
2
             +w·γr
2–w·γr
2)·γe/2] /[γr·(2·θe–pr·γe
2)], (23)
tf(γr)= (pr–w)· γr
2·(2·θe–pr·γe
2) /[pr·(θe·γr
2+θe·γr
2
                +θe·γr·γe+θr·γr·γe +a·s·γr·γe)+w·θe·(γr
2–γr
2)], (24)
Lf(γr)= (pr–w)·[(1–s)·a–θr·σ
f(γr)+(pr–w)· γr
2
           /(2·tf(γr))]–πmin
r.    (25)
See (24), we can find tf(γr) is decreasing in γr, which 
fulfils the requirements of IC and IR constraints. 
Furthermore, we can obtain proposition 3.
Proposition 3
(i) ∂σf/∂s<0; ∂σf/∂θe >0; ∂σ
f/∂θr <0 
(ii) ∂tf/∂s <0; ∂tf/∂θe <0; ∂t
f/∂θr <0
Proposition 3(i)(ii) is nearly the same as proposition 
2, we will  not explain it  in details.  In addition, 
from proposition 3(iii), we can derive that when the 
manufacture’s initial online market grows up, manufacture 
should acquire a larger franchise fee from retailer. When 
it becomes easier to attract offline consumers to online, 
manufacture may also acquire a larger franchise fee.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have investigated a research on online 
price discount in an online and offline dual channel. 
Under the symmetric demand information scenario, 
once the advertising is easier to convert to demand in 
any distribution channel, it is more profitable for retailer 
to invest in more advertisement fee. We also find price 
discount is a competitive tool to get consumer from 
retailer, while the cost sharing ratio is an effective tool 
to coordinate conflict caused by competition. Under 
the asymmetric demand information scenario, we have 
derived that retailer has a motivation to lie about the 
impact factors of price discount and advertising effort. In 
different situations, retailer will adjust their lying about 
demand information in three different ways. 
Furthermore, retailer will always lie a higher impact 
factor of advertising effort than the real one. And the 
retailer’s lying behavior may cause revenue loss of 
manufacture. To help manufacture deal with the problem, 
we design a franchise-fee contract. However, when both 
the information of price discount impact and advertising 
effort impact are asymmetric. In contract menu, optimal 
price discount is only decreasing in offline price-
discount impact factors; retailer’s advertisement sharing 
ratio is only decreasing in offline advertising effort 
impact factors. It is hard to derive the optimal contract to 
maximize manufacture’s revenue, while inducing retailer 
to tell the true information. Finally, we consider a special 
case of the initial problem. We assume that only the 
impact of price discount is known to both manufacture 
and retailer. Optimal franchise-fee contract can be 
obtained. 
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APPENDIX
The proof of Lemma 1:
Considering πr(θr,γr)’s first-order derivatives of θr and γr, we can get:
.
From this equation, Lemma 1 can be obtained.
